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Flag Profanation and the Law
By EMMET V. MIT-LEBEELER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen numerous deliberate acts of mutilation
or destruction of one of the most cherished of all American
emblems-the flag of the United States of America. These have
been performed in public, often before a sympathetic crowd,
and nearly always for the purpose of protesting a current policy
or action of the government or a social practice or custom. Use
of the flag or flag design in unconventional ways, as in clothing,
decorations, and advertising, even where no political protest is
intended, has also become prevalent.
Both types of flag abuse-"desecration"-have presented vex-
atious constitutional questions, especially in regard to freedom of
expression. Questions about such freedom of course are not new
but now they involve an especially unique and respected object-
the flag. A widespread body of citizens venerates the flag with
an almost religious fervor. Extreme adherents of this body in
times past have sought to enforce outward respect, as by com-
pelling the saluting1 or pledging of allegiance 2 to the flag, in
public schools. Incidents have been recorded in which private
individuals, acting without color of law, have forced unpopular
persons to manifest outward obeisance to the flag.' To persons
- B.A., 1936, LL.B., 1939; J.D., 1970, University of Louisville; M.A., 1950;
Ph.D., 1951, University of Chicago.
1 The place of flag salute cases in American constitutional history is well
known. The two principal Supreme Court decisions in this area are West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and the case which it
overruled, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). See also
D. MANWARING, RNDER UNTo CAnsAm: Tim FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962).
2 The pledge of allegiance to the flag, thought to have been written by Rev.
Francis Bellamy, was adopted by Congress in 1942. June 22, 1942, ch. 435, Sec. 7,
56 Stat. 380 and December 22, 1942, ch. 802, Sec. 7, 56 Stat. 1077. It was altered
somewhat December 28, 1945, ch. 607, 59 Stat. 668. The words "under Cod" were
added by H.R.J. Res. 243, June 14, 1954, P.L. 83-396. The present form appears
in 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1970).
3 See e.g., Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920) and Johnson v. State,
163 S.W.2d 153 (Ark. 1942). The tribulations of Jehovahs Witnesses in this
respect have been widely publicized. See e.g., McKee v. State, 37 N.E.2d 940 (Ind.
1941).
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who would exalt the flag into a kind of mystical reification of the
nation, this writer-without pejorative implication-gives the
name of the cult of vexillatry.4 Public defilement of the flag is
anathema to the cult.
This article will examine in their most recent context, con-
stitutional and legal issues arising from profanation of the flag of
the United States. The principal question can be briefly stated
thus: Can profanation 5 of national flags be prohibited? This em-
braces two subordinate questions: Is profanation of a flag as a
means of political protest protected as symbolic speech-a free-
dom covered by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Can
the non-destructive or non-mutilative use of flags and objects
having some resemblance to flags, in unconventional ways, be
regulated or prohibited in the absence of any overt attempt at
political expression?
Physically, a flag is a piece of cloth, usually rectangular, and
often attached to a pole or a staff. It is its symbolic nature,
however, which gives rise to legal problems. A national flag is a
unique chattel, which can be bought and sold in the open market,
but for which special treatment is expected. In the United States
the design of the flag is set forth by statute and executive order;
a Flag Code prescribes the proper manner in which it is to be
used; and statutes of fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government prohibit acts of disrespect or profanation. 6
4 Vexillatry, meaning worship or veneration of the flag, has been coined for
this article. It is derived from vexillum, Latin for banner or standard, and atraria,
Latin suffix for worship, as found in idolatraria, Latin for idolatry. The second
syllable should be accented.
5 "Profanation" is employed' to mean disrespectful use, such as destruction,
mutilation, defilement, commercial exploitation, improper display, or defacement.
"Desecration" will not be used, except when necessary for legal precision or
identification, or with quotation marks. Webster distinguishes profanation from
desecration in that the former implies "irreverence or contempt as shown in vulgar
intrusion or vandalism," the latter "a loss of sacred character, as though pollution,
defilement, or reduction to secular usage." Nmv INTERNATIoNAL DIcrroNAnY OF
Tm ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.). Strictly speaking, the flag cannot be desecrated,
because it has no sacred character. It can, however, be profaned. At this point,
the writer gives his own reaction to flag profanation: as an act of personal conduct
and morality, he condemns it.
6 See, Hearings on H.R. 271 and Similar Proposals to Prohibit Desecration of
the Flag Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, [hereinafter
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 41], 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 324-26 (May 8, 10, 15,
and 17, and June 5, 1967) for a compilation.
Flag profanation has been prohibited in other countries; see a compilation of
relevant German legislation in the appendix to State v. Turner, 478 P.2d 747
(Wash. 1970). Legislation of several countries forbidding the use of flags as trade-
(Continued on next page)
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The flag of the United States was adopted by a resolution of
the Continental Congress of June 14, 1777;7 that resolution fixed
the design which, in general form, has remained in effect. Estab-
lishment of the new governments under the Articles of Confedera-
tion in 1781 and the present Constitution had no effect on the flag,
and statutory enactments on design have been surprisingly few.
An act of 17948 provided that upon the admission of a new state
(Vermont and Kentucky had been admitted by that time) a star
and a stripe should be added, but when it was realized that the
unrestricted addition of stripes would produce a blurring and
unsymmetrical effect, Congress provided in 1818' that while the
number of stars should equal the number of states, the number of
stripes should remain at thirteen. Except for a codification in
194710 there have been no other congressional enactments on
design. Details on the number of stars, dimensions, color and
miscellany are controlled by executive orders. The design of the
flag now in use was fixed by President Eisenhower upon the
admission of Hawaii, the fiftieth state."
II. FLAG PROFANATION LEGISLATION
A. Common Law
At common law flags enjoyed no special protection; no early
cases of profanation for political purposes have been uncovered,
but there is judicial authority that no one might claim a pro-
prietary right in a representation of the flag as a trade mark, for
it was open to use by anyone.12 A treatise on trademarks toward
the close of the 19th Century recognized the use of the flag in
advertising as legitimate:
(Footnote continued ifrom preceding page)
marks is summarized in W. BROWNE, A TREAISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARys
AND ANALorous SUBJECTS 678 et seq. (2d ed. 1898). Inadequately cited, as well as
probably antiquated, laws on profanation in a number of countries, are listed in
the REPORT OF THE SENATE COIDTTEE ON MiLrrARY AFFAmS, to accompany S.
1426, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1904). The Russian Federated Socialist Republic
has also prohibited defacing the national emblem. Art. 190 ch. 9, Decrees of
September 16, 1966.
7 JouNALs OF THE AbmicAN CoNGprss, Vol. II, at 165 (1823).
8 of january 13, 1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 341.
9 4 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
104 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
11 Exec. Order No. 10834, 3 C.F.R. 367 (Aug. 21, 1959).
12 Johnson v. Hitchcock, 3 N.Y.S. 680 (1888), where the Supreme Court of
New York County granted an injunction against the use by a competitor of a flag(Continued on next page)
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Color may be of the essence of a mark of manufacture or com-
merce, known as a "trade-mark." National flags are some-
times blended with other objects to catch the eye. They are
admirably adapted to all purposes of heraldic display, and
their rich, glowing colors appeal to feelings of patriotism,
and even purchases of the merchandise to which they are
affixed.... One flag printed in green may catch the eye of a
son of the Emerald Isle.... Another flag, with stars on a blue
field and stripes of alternate red and white, may secure a
preference for the commodity upon which it is stamped.' 3
B. National Legislation
Earliest agitation for national legislation against flag pro-
fanation seems to have been inspired by popular outcries against
use of the flag for advertising, though flag mutilations and de-
structions as protests had occurred since early times. Beginning
in the last quarter of the 19th Century bills appeared in Congress
to forbid the use of flags for advertising and their being marked
or lettered in the interest of candidates for political office.
Examination of congressional debates and committee reports
from introduction of the first flag "desecration" bill shows that
the use of the flag in protest gestures was not a major motivation
for anti-profanation legislation. For example, when the American
Flag Association endorsed S-229, then pending in the 57th Con-
gress, it listed thirteen common acts of profanation, but all except
one-"The flag has been stripped from the staff and torn to shreds
and stamped upon by anarchists and others in excitement and
anger"-related to political and commercial advertisements, use
in clothing and costumes, and functional uses like employment as
sacks. 4 A leading abuse long before the Civil War was placing
the names of candidates on flags, with the result that in melees
(Footnote continued Trom preceding page)
with stars studding the upper and lower borders, but added by way of dictum that
the defendant bad as much right as the plaintiff to use a picture of the flag.
13 W. BnowNE, supra note 6, at 275. But a Massachusetts statute (Stat. of 1903,
ch. 195, See. 1) prohibiting the use of the arms or great seal of the state, and any
representation of it, for any advertising or commercial purpose was upheld because
of the state's proprietary right. Commonwealth v. R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 189
Mass. 76, 4 Ann. Cas. 268 (1905).
14 Hearings on S. 226, S. 596, S. 1220, and S. 3504 Before the Senate Comm.
on Military Affairs, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. at 4 (1920).
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involving hostile demonstrators, the flag often received rough
treatment.15
Use of the flag for clothing was also rampant; a speaker in
1898 deplored the fact that flags had been used as coats for black
face minstrels, skirts for ballet dancers, trunks by prize fighters,
and garb of circus clowns and professional bicycle riders, and
had been made into hammocks, dog blankets, equine fly nets,
sofa pillows and bed quilts.'6
Agitation against profanation reached its height in the early
1900's, but sentiment in support of penal legislation was by no
means unanimous. Voices were raised against prohibiting com-
mercial use of the flag, and even the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary declared in 1896 that while he had
voted for a profanation bill on the floor, "the more I think of it
the more there seems to be in the way of objection to any
legislation on the subject.... It is a very difficult thing to deal
with, and whether it would not be better to leave it to the good
taste and good sense of private citizens I very much question."' 7
During World War I verbal flag abuse was prohibited. By a
1918 act it was forbidden, while the United States was at war:
to willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language about ... the flag of the United
States... or any language intended to bring the... flag of the
United States . . . into contempt, scorn, contumely, or dis-
repute....
Advocating, teaching, defending, or suggesting the doing of any
of these acts was also forbidden, and any employee or official of
the United States government "who in an abusive and violent
manner" criticized "the Army or Navy or the flag of the United
States" should "at once be dismissed from the service."' 8 There
was no law against profanation, except by words, and after repeal
15 See Desecration of the American Flag and Prohibitive Legislation, address
by Charles Kingsbury Miller before Illinois Sons of the American Revolution,
November 2, 1898; 9B UNIFOwM LAWS ANNOTA=TED 48 (1966).
10 Miller, supra note 15.
17 28 CONG. REC. 1268-69 (1896) (remarks of Sen. George F. Hoar).
18 Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553, amending Title I, cb. 30, §
3, 40 Stat. 217.
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of this act in 1921,19 no national law prohibited any kind of
profanation until 1968.
Presumably in the 1920's there was some promotion of a
national flag profanation law, since an Attorney General's Opinion
of May 15, 1925,20 pointed out the absence of such legislation,
and stated that under Halter v. Nebraska2 l Congress might enact
such a statute for the entire country. "But until Congress actually
exercises its power, the States are free to act, and the silence of
Congress, in this case at least, is not to be taken as a declaration
that the States must refrain from acting. Should Congress wish
to assume control, it has power, under the Constitution, to do so."
Although commercial and political misuse was considered the
major evil at the turn of the century, there is not yet a federal
statute penalizing general use of the national colors for political
or commercial advertising. Only in 1905 was use of the flag of
the United States as a trade mark prohibited;2 2 an enactment
deprived the Commissioner of Patents of the authority to register
insignia of the United States as trade marks, though for several
years before the act was passed, the Commissioner had been
refusing the registration of the coat of arms of the United States
or of a state on the ground of public policy.23 The court
thought that even if the 1905 act had not been passed, the Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
March 20, 1888, to which the United States was a party, "would
have suggested the acquiescence of Congress to the refusal to
register coats of arms of a state.... The 1905 act remains on
the books in amended form. 5
The 1883 Convention,26 which prohibited use of national
emblems as trade marks, has since been revised by numerous
19 Act of Mar. 31, 1921, ch. 75, 41 Stat. 1359.
20 34 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 483 (1935).
21205 U.S. 34 (1907), a f'g 105 N.W. 298 (Neb. 1905).2 2 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725.
23 In re Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. 173 (1906).
24 Id. at 180. For other applications of the 1905 statute see In re American
Glue Co., 277 App. D.C. 391 (1906), respecting a simulation of the Great Seal,
and In re William Connors Paint Manufacturing Co., 27 App. D.C. 389 (1906),
where a design resembling the seal of the Department of Justice, bearing exposed
ends of several American flags, was denied registration.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1970).
26 2 W. MALLOy, TREATiEs, CONVENTIONS, INTEnNATiONAL ACTs, PnoTocoLs
AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNTrED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS
1776-1909, 1935 (1910).
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international agreements, the most recent of which was entered
into in Lisbon in 1958 and set up a union for the protection of
industrial property.27 There is also a Pan American Trade Con-
vention of February 20, 1929.28 Such international agreements are
broad enough to embrace prohibition by a state of use of its own
flag as a trade mark.29
Use of the flag for advertising is also disapproved by a 1942
Joint Resolution of Congress designed as a "codification of existing
rules and customs." 0 Section 176 declared, "No disrespect should
be shown to the flag of the United States," while subsections
covered profanations:
(g) The flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any
part of it, nor attached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word,
figure, design, picture, or drawing of any nature.
(i) The flag should never be used for advertising purposes
in any manner whatsoever. It should not be embroidered on
such articles as cushions or handkerchiefs and the like, printed
or otherwise impressed on paper napkins or boxes or anything
that is designed for temporary use and discard; or used as
any portion of a costume or athletic uniform. Advertising
signs should not be fastened to a staff of halyard from which
the flag is flown.81
But the Joint Resolution prescribed no penalty so could entail no
27 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931 (Oct. 31, 1958).
28 45 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833, 124 L.N.T.S. 357, 2 Bevans 751 (1927).29 See also Wilson, Respect for National Flag, 12 Am. J. INTL. L. 662 (1935).
30 Though the constitutionality of prohibitions of the commercial use of foreign
flags has never been ruled upon it was decided in a 1912 federal case that a
plaintiff who had used the flag of Italy as a trade-mark had no standing in equity
to have restrained another cigar manufacturer from using a trade-mark similar to
his own. "The policy of the law, as indicated by the statutes . . . recognizes the
impropriety of using the flags of nations upon advertising matter .. " De Nobili
v. Sanda, 198 F. 341, 346 (D. Pa. 1912). Federal statute expressly prohibits
commercial use of the coat of arms of Switzerland, which, because of its design of
a white cross on red, is peculiarly subject to such practice. 18 U.S.C. § 708 (1970).
The multiplication of national states and of subordinate units of government, with
consequent proliferation of flags, makes it increasingly likely that no matter what
kind of flag-even one with a design originating in the mind of the American ad-
vertiser-is depicted, it will turn out to be the flag of some nation, state, or
municipality. Even use of a simple all red flag might inadvertently be offensive to
Zanzibar, which for a number of years had such a flag. An all white flag was once
used in France.
31 36 U.S.C. § 176 (1970).
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prosecutions. Further, through use of "should" rather than "shall"
it was merely hortatory, not mandatory or even normative.32
Though distaste for advertising and not mutilation of the
flag as a political protest seems to have originally inspired the
unsuccessful agitation for a national flag statute, Congress did not
pass a profanation statute until after a series of dramatic acts
related to the Vietnam war. A rash of public flag burnings in
protest against that conflict turned congressional attention to
this type of misbehavior, and to the realization that in fact no
federal flag profanation statute existed.
The present flag profanation law38 resembles rather closely
the Uniform Flag Act, discussed infra, which fifteen states have
enacted. Pertinent portions of the federal act bear quotation:
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burn-
ing, or trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(b) The term 'flag of the United States' as used in this sec-
tion, shall include any flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any
picture or representation of either, or of any part or parts of
either, made of any substance or represented on any substance,
of any size and evidently purporting to be either of said flag,
standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America, or
a picture or a representation of either, upon which shall be
shown in the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number
of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the
average person seeing the same without deliberation may be-
lieve the same to represent the flag, standards, colors, or en-
sign of the United States of America.
In one respect it differs: the federal statute prohibits burning,
whereas the Uniform Law assumes this is included in other pro-
hibited acts. One can suppose that "burning" was inserted be-
32 For a judicial pronouncement on the effect of that code section, see State of
Delaware ex rel Trader v. Hudson, 265 F.Supp. 308 (D. Del. 1967), where it was
also held that the state had no interest in compelling compliance with existing
rules and customs respecting flag use. A portion of the code (36 U.S.C. § 176(a),
(d), and (h) was nevertheless used as a standard by the Municipal Court of Cin-
cinnati to determine if actions were contemptuous under the Ohio profanation law,
OHIO REv. CoDE. ANN. § 2921.05 (Page 1954). State v. Bunch, 268 N.E.2d 831
(Ohio 1970).
33 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1970).
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cause that spectacle was so vividly before Congress in 1967 and
1968. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary34 also had before
it the recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of United
States v. Mille, 31 on draft card burning.
Passage of a federal law was undertaken against the previously
proffered advice of the Uniform Law Commissioners on the
proposed Uniform Flag Act: "This is purely state legislation,
although some think that it ought to take the form of con-
gressional legislation. However, it is considered that this subject
properly belongs to the states and that federal legislation would
not be nearly as effective as the state legislation."36
C. State Legislation
South Dakota was the first state to enact a flag protection law. 7
The target of such laws was commercial and political advertising
although they were often broad enough to include all kinds of
deliberate mutilation. They varied widely; some suffered from
poor draftsmanship, some were flagrantly unconstitutional, and
others covered the most innocent use of the flag.38 To clear up
34 S. REP. No. 1287, to accompany H.R. 10,480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
2 U.S. CODE CONCESSIONAL AND ADmINISnATIVE NEvs 2507 (1968).
35 367 F.2d 72 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). To protest against
military action in Vietnam and the draft law, a young man publicly burned his
Notice of Classification card, and in a prosecution under 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462(b)
(3) (1970) for destroying the card tried to justify his action on the ground that it
was protected symbolic speech. Declining to recognize the identity of pure and
symbolic speech, the Court of Appeals in affirming conviction reasoned that for-
bidding the destruction of the certificates served a legitimate purpose in administer-
ing the system, and weighed this interest against that of freedom of expression.
Quoting from Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965): ". .. it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." See infra
for discussion of symbolic speech. A more recent and authoritative pronounce-
ment of the Supreme Court on the draft card situation is O'Brien v. United States,
discussed infra.
36 9 B UNwoFmv LAWS ANNOTATED 48 (1966).
37 S.D. Laws 1897, ch. 119, approved February 26, 1897.38 A New York statute prohibiting marking on the flag was held invalid as to
articles manufactured and in existence at a time when it was lawful to manufacture
or possess them. People ex rel McPike v. Van De Carr, 178 N.Y. 425, 70 N.E. 965,
66 L.R.A. 189, 102 Am.St. Rep. 516 (1904). For its application to the likeness
of a flag that had been painted upon an automobile as an advertisement, see People
v. Pickering, 228 N.Y. 644, N.E.2d 741 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632, in which
constitutionality of the then New York profanation law was upheld. Alone among
the states, Pennsylvania exempts "any patriotic or political demonstration or
decoration" from the prohibition of placing words on a flag. Act of June 24, 1939,
P.L. 872, as amended, PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4211 (1936). See Commonwealth v.
(Continued on next page)
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obvious defects and regularize such statutes, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1917 pre-
sented to the states a Uniform Flag Act, 9 though to date its aim
has not been realized.
As will be shown later, the Uniform Flag Act has been
vulnerable to constitutional attack. Crosson v. Silver,40 infra, as-
sumes that the Supreme Court in Street v. New York"' had
eliminated from it the words, "by word", and after the Street
decision the Washington legislature amended its version of the
Uniform Act by like excision, adding public burning to the list
of proscribed acts, and inserting the adverb "knowingly."4
In the excitement of World War I, states passed laws similar
to that of the United States, prohibiting verbal abuse. A Montana
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Janoff and Haugh, 256 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1969), which held the exemption applicable
where the words "Make Love Not War" and "The New American Revolutionaries"
had been placed on a flag.
39 The Uniform Flag Act reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Definition-The words flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, as
used in this act shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield,
or copy, picture or representation thereof, made of any substance or
represented as produced thereon, and of any size, evidently purporting to
be such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of
this state, or a copy, picture, or representation thereof.
Sec. 2. Desecration-No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or
display, (a) place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture,
design, drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state, or authorized
by law of the United States or of this state; or (b) expose to public view
any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall have
been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been
attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark,
picture, design, drawing or advertisement; or (c) expose to public view
For sale, manufacture, or otherwise, or to sell, give or have in possession
for sale, for gift or for use for any purpose, any substance being an
article of merchandise, or receptacle, or thing for holding or carrying
merchandise, upon or to which shall have been produced or attached
any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, in order to advertise, call
attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish such article or substance.
Sec. 3. Mutilation-No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, stan-
dard, color, ensign or shield.
Sec. 4. Exceptions-This statute shall not apply to any act permitted by
the statutes of the United States (or of this state), or by the United States(or of this state), or by the United States Army and Navy regulations,
nor shall it apply to any printed or written document or production,
stationery, ornament, picture or jewelry whereon shall be depicted said
flag, standard, color, ensign or shield with no design or words thereon and
disconnected with any advertisement.
40 319 F.Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970).
41 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See infra for discussion.42 Wash. Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 110, at 823.
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statute 43 making it an offense to utter contemptuous and slurring
language about the flag was upheld44 on the ground that since
Halter v. Nebraska5 a state might legislate to protect the flag.
D. Halter v. Nebraska
A Nebraska act4 6 gave rise to a Supreme Court decision that
if a state chooses to protect the national flag from commercial
defflement, the federal constitution does not stand in the way.
Because that decision has been so frequently (and erroneously)
used to support flag legislation, and has employed such sweeping
language, it deserves analysis.
The statute had made it a misdemeanor for anyone to sell,
expose for sale, or have in his possession for sale, any article of
merchandise upon which had been printed or placed, for the
purpose of advertisement, a representation of the flag of the
United States.47 It expressly excepted any act allowed by United
States or army or navy regulations, or any "newspaper, periodical,
book, pamphlet, circular, certificate, diploma, warrant, or com-
mission of appointment to office, ornamental picture, article of
jewelry, or stationery for use in correspondence", in which the
flag should be printed, painted or placed "disconnected from any
advertisement."48 The defendant had placed a representation of
the flag on bottles of beer he had been selling, and he argued
infringement of personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and discrimination in favor of a class through ex-
ception of newspapers and books.
In what is probably its only federal adjudication on the
validity of such a statute, the Court, through the first Mr. Justice
John Marshall Harlan, upheld the enactment. It noted that Con-
gress had established no regulation for the use of the flag, except
the act of 1905, but also observed that more than half of the states
had enacted statutes similar to that of Nebraska. Therefore the
Court must "pause before reaching the conclusion that a majority
of the states have, in their legislation, violated the Constitution
4a Laws Mont. Ex. Sess. 1918, cb. 11.44Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920).
41 205 U.S. 34 (1907), aff'g 105 N.W. 298 (Neb. 1905).





of the United States."49 It concluded that no constitutionally
protected rights had been infringed, and that the statute had no
relation to a subject exclusively committed to the national govern-
ment. In a passage more notable for rhetoric than pure law, but
reflective of a sentiment that cannot be dissociated from legisla-
tion, the Court declared:
From the earliest periods in the history of the human race,
banners, standards and ensigns have been adopted as symbols
of the power and history of the peoples who bore them. It
is not then remarkable that the American people, acting
through the legislative branch of the Government, early in
their history, prescribed a flag as symbolic of the existence
and sovereignty of the Nation. Indeed, it would have been
extraordinary if the Government had started this country upon
its marvelous career without giving to it a flag to be recog-
nized as the emblem of the American Republic. For that
flag every true American has not simply an appreciation but a
deep affection. No American, nor any foreign born person
who enjoys the privileges of American citizenship, ever looks
upon it without taking pride in the fact that he lives under
this free Government. Hence, it has often occurred that in-
sults to a flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put
upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have often been
resented and sometimes punished on the spot.50
Finding a connection between the love of nation and state,
and their symbols, the Court thought that such love would
diminish in proportion as respect for the flag was weakened. That
would occur if the flag were used for commercial purposes, for
defflement would degrade and cheapen the flag in the estimation
of the people. This statute had its origin in a purpose to cultivate
a feeling of patriotism among the people of Nebraska, so the
Court could not say that the state infringed the constitutional
rights of anyone.
The argument that the statute was an improper classification
was met by the statement that no one had a constitutional right
to use the flag merely for the purposes of advertising merchandise
while a representation of a flag, wholly disconnected from an
49205 U.S. 34, 40 (1907).50 Id. at 41.
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advertisement, might be used upon a newspaper, periodical, or
book, in such a way as not to offend. The decision also associated
flag misuse with breaches of the peace.5' One may question
whether commercial flag abuse excites so much resentment as
Mr. Justice Harlan feared, though, a relationship between breach
of the peace and flag defilement can exist. The effect of the
decision is that a state may constitutionally protect the national
flag from commercial defilement. Discussion of the use of the
flag in association with freedom of expression is absent, though
courts have often confused the issues.52
III. SYMBOLISM AS PROTECTED EXPRESSION
A. Symbolic Speech Generally
Misuse of flags as a protest must be considered within the
context of protection of non-verbal expression of opinion. Courts
have not yet struck a universally acceptable balance between the
right to express one's self, guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, on the one hand, and the duty of society to main-
tain order, on the other. At various points in the spectrum, pure
speech shades off into symbolic speech, which in turn becomes
acts of varying degrees of unlawful violence. It is possible even
to classify assassination as symbolic speech; when John Wilkes
Booth shot President Lincoln he was protesting Union govern-
ment policy. As the growing literature53 in this field indicates
51 See Halter v. State, 105 N.W. 298, 300 (Neb. 1905), where the Supreme
Court of Nebraska discusses this point at length.
52 See, e.g., Oldroyd v. Kugler, 327 F.Supp. 176 (D. N.J. 1970).53 See, e.g., Note, Decal Superimposing Peace Symbol on Flag not within
Scope of New York General Business Law, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 360 (1971); Note,
Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration, 12
Amuz. L. REv. 71 (1970); Leahy, Flamboyant Protest, the First Amendment and
the Boston Tea Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 185 (1970); Note, Flag Desecration:
Illegal Conduct or Protected Expression? 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 555 (1971);
Note, Symbolic Conduct of Speech, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 1091 (1968); Prosser,
Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. L. F. 159 (1969); Note, Flag Desecration
as Constitutionally Protected Speech, 56 IowA L. REv. 614 (1971); Olesnyckyi,
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Expression-Symbolic Free Speech, 58 Ky. L.J.
388 (1969-70); Note, Freedom of Speech-Descration of National Symbols as Pro-
tected Political Expression, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1040 (1968); Trott, Constitutional law
-First Amendment Rights-Flags Burning as Symbolic Expression, 48 N.C. L. REV.
201 (1970; Tushla, Flag Desecration-the Unsettled Issue, 46 Noms D. LAw. 201
(1970); McCorkle, Flag Desecration under the First Amendment: Conduct or
Speech, 32 OHuO ST. L.J. 110 (1971); Cohen, Flag Desecration Statute in light of
United States v. O'Brien and the First Amendment, 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 513
(Continued on next page)
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courts more and more are being called upon to square the two
concepts, and the importance of flag profanation legislation lies
in this particular area.
One of the earliest symbolic conduct cases 54 concerned flags,
though the Supreme Court decision did not emphasize flags,
and contained only hints of the problem that was to come upon
the nation in full force thirty-five years later. A California
statute5 had prohibited the display of a:
red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner or device
of any color or form whatever in any public place or in any
meeting place or public assembly, or from or on any house,
building or window as a sign, symbol, or opposition to orga-
nize government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditous
character....
The Court noted that the statute contained three purposes, and
it was impossible to say under which of the clauses expressing
the purposes conviction was obtained, so that if any of the clauses
was invalid, conviction could not be sustained. The first clause,
relating to a display "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition
to organize government," was invalid and that vitiated the whole.
The statute was void on its face because it was so indefinite as
to permit punishment of use of an opportunity to oppose the
government.
Historically, the issue seems to have been brought to the
fore for the first time in labor disputes. Thornhill v. Alabama,5 6
struck down a statute prohibiting loitering or picketing about a
place of business for the purpose of influencing or inducing others
not to trade there or work for that business.
Symbolic expression became quite prevalent in civil rights
activity in the 1950's and 1960's. When demonstrators taking
seats at a lunch counter reserved for whites were subsequently
prosecuted under a statute prohibiting breach of peace but de-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)(1971); Note, Flag Burning, Flag Waving, and the Law, 4 VALrPRmso U. L. 1Ev.
345 (1970); Finman and Macaley, Freedom to Dissent; The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. 1 Ev. 623 (1966).
54 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
,;5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 403a (West 1954).56310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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fining it as the doing of specified violent, boisterous, or disruptive
acts, their act was recognized as symbolic speech. In a concurring
opinion to a decision overturning the conviction on the ground
that the statute was of too broad application,57 Mr. Justice Harlan
declared the court would have to be blind not to know that the
defendants had sat at the counters knowing full well they would
not be served. Their demonstration, was as much a part of the
free trade in ideas as a speech.58
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham59 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the First and Fourteenth Amendment protected
those who would communicate ideas by patrolling, marching,
and picketing on streets and highways. An example of balancing
the state's interest in preventing trespasses against the rights of
demonstrators was the earlier case of Adderley v. Florida," where-
by a divided Supreme Court upheld the trespass statute of a
state as against demonstrators who were singing, clapping, and
dancing on a nonpublic county jail driveway.
Frequent burnings of draft cards by young men protesting
military action in Vietnam as well as the draft system itself have
raised anew the controversy over protection of symbolic speech.
The leading case is O'Brien v. United States,6x which has been
used on occasion to sustain flag burning convictions. Because of
outward similarities in the draft card and flag situations, an analy-
sis of the decision is pertinent. A young man publicly burned his
Selective Service registration certificate on the steps of the South
Boston court house, and was charged with having violated 50
U.S.C. App., § 462(b) (3), which penalized one "who forges,
alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner
changes such certificate."62 Defendant asserted that prohibition
of destruction was unconstitutional because it had been enacted
to abridge free speech and because it served no legislative pur-
pose.
The Supreme Court upheld conviction, denying that draft
57 Garner v. Louisiana, 868 U.S. 157 (1961).
58 Reference was made here to Wbitney v. California, 274 U.S. 857, 375
(1927).
59 894 U.S. 147 (1969).
60 885 U.S. 39 (1966), -rehearing denied, 885 U.S. 1020 (1967).
61 891 U.S. 367 (1968).
6250 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (3) (1970).
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card burning was protected symbolic speech. The view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct could be called "speech"
for constitutional purposes, whenever someone intended to ex-
press an idea, was rejected. Verbal speech was thus not identical
with non-verbal "speech." A standard designed to harmonize
expression with government regulation was thereupon devised:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within
the constitutional power of government; (2) it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; (8) that interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the
incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
In examining the nature of the object destroyed, the Court
reasoned that Selective Service certificates served a useful pur-
pose in draft law administration, thereby following United States
v. Miller.63 The nation had a vital interest in an efficient army-
raising system, and therefore in assuring the continuing avail-
ability of draft certificates. The draft card burner was arrested
for the non-communicative aspect of his conduct but no view was
expressed on the constitutionality of penalizing the communicative
aspect, i.e., public expression of his opposition to the war and the
draft. He had thwarted the public interest of having a smoothly
running draft system. It would follow, in this writer's opinion,
that he could have been convicted even had he burned his card
in private. The motive of Congress-said by the card burner to
be the stifling of opposition to the Vietnam war-in passing the
statute was declared irrelevant. The court did not discuss the
relationship of draft card burning as a public spectacle to pos-
sible breach of the peace.
Pupils in public schools who wore black arm bands in protest
against Vietnam hostilities received the protection of the two
Amendments in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.64 The court
divided not over whether wearing of black armbands was sym-
bolic speech, or whether symbolic speech was protected, but
whether that protection extended into public schools. The ma-
jority opinion, containing these words, was written by Mr.
63 367 F. 2d 72 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
64 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Justice Fortas, one of the dissenters in Street v. New York, dis-
cussed later:
m.. in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom
of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation
may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion
may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom,
or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But
our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v.
Chicago, 837 U.S. 1 (1949); and our history says that it is
this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is
the basis of our national strength and of the independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society. 65
No judicial pronouncement on flag profanation on property of a
school below the college level has been discovered. 66
One aspect of the symbolic speech problem, already apparent
in some of the cases discussed, is that of overbreadth-that in
the pursuit of a legitimate end the state runs the risk of expanding
its sanctions so far as to restrict freedom of expression.67 In
Gainer v. Louisiana,6 reversing the conviction of some blacks
who deliberately sat at a lunch counter reserved for whites, Mr.
Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion conceded that the state
had an interest in the preservation of peace and harmony, but
when it:
. . . seeks to subject to criminal sanctions conduct which,
except for a demonstrated paramount state interest, would be
within the range of freedom of expression as assured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot do so by means of a general
and all inclusive breach of the peace prohibition. It must
bring the activity sought to be proscribed within the ambit of
05 Id. at 508, 509.66 In Texarkana Independent School District v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971), a Texas Court of Civil Apgeals referred to the action of the Board
of Trustees of a local high school declaring 'Desecration of the American flag" to be
"major disruptive behavior," i.e. "activity or action by any student that interferes
with the normal routine operation of the school program .... "
67See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 88 HAuv. L. REv.
844, 853-55 (1970).68368 U.S. 157 (1961).
1972]
KENTucKY LAW JouRNAL
a statute or clause "narrowly drawn to define and punish
specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger
to a substantial interest of the State." Cantwell v. Con-
necticut69 , .. ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105.70
B. Flag Profanation as Protest
Flag profanation as political expression has occasionally oc-
curred in American history. Captain John Endicott, commander
of a military company in Salem, Massachusetts Bay Colony, in
1634 cut out, or had cut out, one part of the red cross of the
King's colors, because of the alleged connection of the cross with
the papacy.71 A British flag was torn to pieces after British troops
left New York in 1783.2 After news of the secession of Virginia
in 1861 had been received in Liberty, Mississippi, a United States
flag was burned in the public square before cheering spectators.73
A burial of a United States flag was publicly celebrated in Mem-
phis in 1861,7' and in 1870 a student at Kentucky State University,
influenced by post-Civil War emotionalism, destroyed a flag."
More recently, flags have been profaned in demonstrations
against United States military action in Vietnam, and our racial
friction, and such symbolic speech cases are now reaching the
courts. Federal district courts have held state profanation statutes
invalid in three cases 6 and have upheld them in two.7 7 Another
69 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
70 868 U.S. 157, 202-08 (1961).
71 L. MAYo, JOHN ENDICOTT: A BIOcRAPHY 85-87 (1939).
72 p. HARRISON, STARS AND STRIPES AND OTHER AMEAucAN FLAGS 134 (1906).
73 Id. at 189.
74 Id. The New York Express of April 29, 1861, is given as a source.
75 Taylor, Bases for Conflict in the Kentucky Constitutional Convention 1890-
91, 46 THE FILSON CLUB HISTORY QuARTERLY 24, 31 (1972).
76 Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 532 (1953), State v. Hodsdon, 265 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1967). This was the third bid of litigation arising from the same
flag display; someone had placed the American flag at half mast on the wrong
side of the United Nations flag, in front of his home. First a private citizen upon
the relation of the state bad attempted to enjoin the display. Then came a
prosecution under the Delaware profanation statute, in which defendant's motion
to dismiss and for a writ of prohibition from the Delaware Supreme Court was
denied on procedural grounds. Hodson v. Supreme Court of Delaware for New
Castle County, 239 A.2d 222 (Del. 1968). North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-381 (1969), Parker v. Morgan, 822 F.Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Arizona,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-793(c) (1956), the Uniform Flag Act, Crosson v.
Silver, 819 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970).
77 Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56-1/, § 6 (1969) Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323
F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971). New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 107-3 (1969),
Oldroyd v. Kugler, 827 F. Supp 176 (D. N.J. 1970). A declaratory judgment
(Continued on next page)
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district court has ruled that a state statute was unconstitutionally
applied,78 and a Court of Appeals has struck down a portion of
another.70 A different Court of Appeals has restricted the applica-
tion of the federal statute, withholding a ruling on constitu-
tionality.80
The United States Supreme Court, therefore, will supposedly
be giving a ruling on the subject sooner or later, and clear up the
confusion into which this branch of law has fallen. The closest
it has come to it was Street v. New York, and its thorough dis-
cussion of the problem there deserves analysis. That case, how-
ever, did not reach the fundamental question of whether public
destruction of a flag in conscious protest could constitutionally be
prohibited."'
Sidney Street, an Afro-American, while listening to a radio in
his Brooklyn apartment, heard that James Meredith, the civil
rights leader, had been shot by a sniper. Muttering to himself
"They didn't protect him," he took from a drawer his 48-star
American flag, which he had previously displayed on national
holidays, and carried it to an intersection near his residence.
There he unfolded the flag, applied a lighted match to it, and
dropped it to the pavement when it started to burn. A crowd
gathered, and a police officer a few moments later stopped his car
and found the burning flag. He testified he came upon Street
shouting to a group, "We don't need no damn flag," and in re-
sponse to the officer's question whether he had burned the flag,
Street replied, "Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that
happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag." There was
no evidence of violence or other disorder.
Street was charged with disorderly conduct and malicious
(Footnote continued -from preceding page)
action to invalidate the Colorado statute was dismissed on procedural grounds in
Fremed v. Johnson, 311 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Colo. 1970).
78 Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE: Art. 27, § 83 (Supp. 1969), Korn v. Elkins,
317 IF. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970). Litigation over proposed publication of
the photograph of a flag burning on the cover of a student magazine.
79New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 137(a) (McKinney 1971), Long Island
Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Calm, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 322
F.Supp. 559 (D. N.Y. 1970), on different grounds. The New York, North Carolina,
and Delaware statutes are virtually identical.8 0 Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971) rev'g 256 A.2d
567 (D.C. C.A. 1970).
81 A state court has ruled affirmatively on this question. People v. Cowgill, 274
Cal. App.2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed, 896 U.S. 371 (1970).
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mischief in that in violation of the New York flag "desecration"
law"2 he willfully and unlawfully defiled, cast contempt on, and
burned an American flag, while uttering the words quoted above.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld conviction for malicious
mischief.8 3 Ruling that the deliberate act of burning an American
flag in public as a protest might constitutionally be punished as a
crime, it recognized that non-verbal expression might be a form
of speech within constitutional protection but stopped short of
saying that the same kind of freedom should be accorded those
whose expression took the form of acts, as those who used pure
speech. By implication, pure speech enjoys more protection, and
if the state can show that the prohibition of certain conduct is
designed to promote the public health, safety, or well-being, the
incidental circumstance that the prohibition has an impact on
speech or expression does not invalidate the legislation. In this
discussion the New York court was simply stating what had
come to be recognized generally, and which the Supreme Court
still maintains.
The New York statute had been designed to prevent the out-
break of violence, by discouraging contemptuous and insulting
treatment of the flag in public, the court noted, and Street's act
was unquestionably one of incitement-literally and figuratively
"incendiary" and "as fraught with danger to the public peace as
if he bad stood on the street corner shouting epithets at passing
pedestrians."8 4 In the interest of the public peace and prevention
of violence, then, the state could constitutionally prohibit pro-
fanation, regardless of freedom of expression. No violence had
been touched off, but that could not be taken as a condonation.
Like the fact that he had been excited by radio news, the absence
of violence should be considered only as a mitigating circum-
stance.
The Supreme Court on appeal did not come to grips with
the central constitutional problem. Splitting five to four, it did
8 2 N.Y. PENAL § 1425 subd. 16 (McKinney 1909), made it a misdemeanor
"publicly to mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt uponeter by words or by act any flag of the United States." In 1967, this was super-
seded by Sec. 136 of the General Business Law, which in par. (d) defines the offense
in identical language. See N.Y. LAws § 52 (McKinney 1965),
83229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
84 229 N.E.2d at 191.
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not consider Street's contention that the New York statute did not
clearly define the forbidden conduct or that a state might not
constitutionally punish one who publicly damaged or destroyed
a flag in protest. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote that the statute had
been unconstitutionally applied because it may have permitted
Street to be punished for speaking words about the flag.
The New York court, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, did
not mention the constitutionality of the verbal element of the
offense, though it impliedly decided it. Street had adequately
met the burden of showing that the issue of the "words" part of
the statute had been properly raised. The Supreme Court thus
had before it a mixed word-act situation: The act of physical
destruction and Street's comments as he burned the flag.
Faced with the intertwining of the two elements, the Court
harked back to Stromberg v. California,5 where the Supreme
Court had thought it would be unconstitutional to punish one
who displayed the flag for one reason but rejected the state court's
reasoning that conviction could be sustained because the other
reasons were severable and constitutional. Because the verdict
was a general one and did not specify the ground upon which it
rested, it was impossible to state under which clause of the statute
the convictions were obtained. By analogy, then, Street's con-
viction would have to be set aside if it could have been based
solely on his words, and a conviction on his words alone would
be unconstitutional."6
85 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
86 Some judicial authority had held that the flag could be profaned by words.
The Uniform Flag Act and a number of state profanation statutes penalize the
casting of contempt, by word or act, upon the flag. Words were held to constitute
profanation in Johnson v. State, 163 S.W.2d 153 (Ark. 1942), despite a dissent
that the words of the defendant, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, about the flag
had been uttered out of a religious conviction. The legal liability for words was
assumed in State v. Shumaker, 175 P. 978 (Kan. 1918) and State v. Peacock, 25
A.2d 491 (Mo. 1942), the decisions turning upon whether the words had been
said publicly. The latter case is unique in that one was prosecuted under the
Uniform Flag Act for going through the motions of tearing up an imaginary
flag; he had said that if he had a real flag he would trample it underfoot. Sensing
the constitutional difficulties of penalizing words, the Attorney General in 1967
had advised the Chairman ofthe Senate Judiciary Commi.ttee that a proposed
"desecration" statute then under consideration would avoid the words "defiles"
and acts like mutilating be made criminal only if performed as a means of casting
contempt on the flag. For text of the communication see Penalties for Desecration
of the Flag, H.R. Rep. No. 350, to accompany H.R. 10,480, at 5, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), laid the issue to rest.
Mere words no longer constitute "desecration."
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Conviction must still be overturned, if it could have been
based upon both words and act. Street had been charged with
two deeds: the burning, and publicly speaking defiant or con-
temptuous words about the flag. The verdict was general and
there was a single penalty, so Street must have been convicted of
both. Unless the record negated "the possibility that the convic-
tion was based on both alleged violations," the judgment had to
be affirmed as to both or neither:
... when a single count indictment or information charges
the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's hav-
ing done both a constitutionally protected act and one which
may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without eluci-
dation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact
will have regarded the two acts as 'intertwined' and have
rested the conviction of both together.8 7
The state, tacitly agreeing that there could be no conviction
for words alone, argued that Street's words were not an inde-
pendent cause of the conviction, and in a further attempt to
downgrade the effect of Street's words asserted that they had not
been spoken publicly, but had been uttered only to the police
officer. Yet the trial judge, reasoned the Court, might have con-
cluded from the testimony that Street's remarks had been made
within the hearing of a crowd, and observed that the sworn infor-
mation used the word "shouted," thereby satisfying the statutory
requirement of publicity. The trial court might also have found
that Street's words defied or cast contempt upon the flag; in short,
thought the Supreme Court, the record was insufficient to elimi-
nate the possibility either that Street's words were the sole basis
of the conviction or that he had been convicted for both his word
and his act.
The conclusion that the state might not constitutionally punish
one for publicly defying or casting contempt upon the flag by
words was arrived at after measurement against the criteria of
just what governmental interest could have been protected by
penalizing contemptuous or defiant words:
(1) Did the state have an interest in deterring Street from
87 Street v. New York, 894 U.S. 576, 588 (1969).
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inciting others to commit unlawful acts? No. Street had urged
no one to do anything unlawful; his words "amounted only to
somewhat excited public advocacy of the idea that the United
States should abandon, at least temporarily, one of its national
symbols.""" The Fourteenth Amendment protects public advocacy
of peaceful change in institutions.
(2) Did the state have an interest in preventing him from
uttering words so inflammatory they would provoke others to
retaliate physically against him, thereby causing a breach of
peace? No, because his words were not so "inherently inflam-
matory as to come within that small class of 'fighting words'
which are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation,
and thereby cause a breach of the peace."9
(3) Did the state have an interest in protecting the sensi-
bilities of passers-by? No. Publicly expressed ideas might not be
prohibited just because they are offensive to some hearers.
(4) Did the state have an interest in insuring that Street,
regardless of the impact of his word on others, should show
respect for the national emblem? The Court's negative response
was based on the words of Mr.Justice Jackson in Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette: "Freedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order."9" Then, Mr. Justice Harlan
continued:
We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed 'free-
dom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary,' and
the 'right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly
one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which
are defiant or contemptuous.9'
The Court carefully avoided an opinion whether Street could
have been punished for burning alone; or whether Street's con-
viction could have been reversed if evidence had been introduced
88 Id. at 591.
8) Id. at 592.
903 19 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
91 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588, 593 (1969).
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that words proved some element of the offense. Nor was there
an opinion that conviction was not permissible because an element
of the crime was proved by Street's words rather than in some
other way. It concluded by remarking that "disrespect for our
flag is to be deplored no less in these vexed times than in calmer
periods of our history, '92 but it revealed reluctance to decide the
one paramount issue.
Each of the four dissenters filed a separate opinion. The Chief
Justice, concerned with what he considered excessive reliance
on speech, felt that the real issue was whether public and
deliberate "desecration" could be constitutionally punished. He
interpreted the record of the trial proceedings as showing that
words had been employed only to show Street's purpose in burn-
ing the flag, and that in issue were in reality only the questions
whether flag burning was protected symbolic speech, and whether
Street had burned the flag while casting contempt upon it or in a
dignified manner. In respect to the latter, the Chief Justice
mentioned that the transcript showed that counsel referred to a
U.S. Code provision "that a flag, when it is in such a condition
that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display, should be de-
stroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning."93 The trial
judge had identified the issue as being one of dignified burning
versus contemptuous burning, so conviction had to be based on
a finding of "desecration."
The words mentioned in the indictment had been produced
at the trial, the Chief Justice went on, only to show that Street
had burned the flag with the intent to "desecrate;" otherwise the
state would have proved only the burning, and left open the
possibility that burning had been designed to destroy it in a
dignified manner. Street had been convicted for his act, not his
words, and the record was not ambiguous. He felt that both the
federal and state governments do have the power to protect the
flag from acts of "descration."
Mr. Justice Black agreed with the unanimous New York Court
of Appeals in construing the statute (as applied to Street) as
making it an offense publicly to burn the flag in protest:
92 Id. at 594.
9336 U.S.C. § 176(j) (1970).
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If I could agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the record as to the possibility of the convictions resting on
these spoken words. I would firmly and automatically agree
that the law is unconstitutional [but be added] It passes my
belief that anything in the Federal Constitution bars a State
from making the deliberate burning of the American flag an
offense. It is immaterial to me that words are spoken in con-
nection with the burning. It is the burning of the flag that the
State has set its face against.94
Mr. Justice White thought it was "fantastic" that the Court
could infer from the record a possibility that the defendant had
been convicted for both burning and uttering words. Likewise,
it was wrong to say that if Street had been convicted for both,
the conviction should be reversed if the speech conviction was
unconstitutional; the law had long been that one good count
along with a bad one or among bad ones sustained a conviction.
Under the decision as it now stood, thought Mr. Justice White,
any conviction for flag burning, where the defendant's words are
critical to proving an intent or other element of the crime, would
be invalid, since a conviction would be based in part on speech.
Mr. Justice Fortas thought that if the flag were only a chattel,
under rules governing personal property, it would still be subject
to state regulation, to avoid danger to life or property. "If the
arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or
shoes as a protest against the Government's fiscal policies, for
example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment
shelter would prevail against the State's claim of a right to avert
danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a
result of the fire." 5 He saw no basis for applying a different rule
to flag burning, but he thought the flag was a special kind of
personalty-a person might "own" a flag but ownership was
subject to special burdens and responsibilities, and as far back as
1907 the court had upheld the validity of a law prohibiting use
of the flag for advertising.' As for protest, it does not exonerate
lawlessness. "And the prohibition against flag burning on the
04 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588, 610 (1969).
9-5 Id. at 616.96 Reference of course is to Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
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public thoroughfare being valid, the misdemeanor is not excused
merely because it is an act of flamboyant protest."9 7
Validity of prohibition of flag destruction as a protest has thus
not yet been decided. But of the dissenting four, three-Chief
Justice Warren and Messrs. Justice Fortas and Black-are no
longer on the bench. Mr. Justice Harlan, author of the majority
opinion, is deceased. Mr. Justice White, still on the court, has
implied a belief that profanation may be penalized, but any pre-
diction of how the court as presently constituted would decide the
issue would be hazardous.
If "desecration" could not be utilized to express disagreement
with a policy of the government, it might be inquired if "desecra-
tion" could be utilized to express agreement. Street's conviction
seems to answer the question in the negative. When Street burned
his flag he was in fact supporting a government policy, for the
federal government at that time was committed to protect James
Meredith and the activities in which he was engaged. In short,
Street was protesting the failure of the government to implement
its own policy.
The Supreme Court came close to another ruling on the New
York statute in 1971, 98 when concern was with neither word nor
act but the use of flags as three-dimensional objects called con-
structions. The defendant, an art dealer, exhibited for sale in
his gallery certain objects fashioned out of flags by an artist, Marc
Morrel; one in the display window consisted of an American flag
stuffed and shaped in a form suggesting a human body hanging
from a yellow noose about its neck. Another was in the form of a
large cross with a bishop's mitre as a head piece, the arms
wrapped in ecclesiastical flags, and an erect phallus wrapped in
an American flag protruding from a vertical standard. The
exhibit, with the theme of peace, was accompanied by a musical
background of taped anti-war songs.
97 Street v. New York, 576, 617 (1969). Since the Supreme Court's refusal to
rule that the New York Statute was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited only flag
burning, New York courts have continued to prosecute for the act of burning. See
People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d 198, 265 N.E.2d 66 (1970), where conviction was
sustained of a defendant who had attached a flag to a vacant building, saturated it
with lighter fluid, and set it afire, exclaiming, "I am going to burn Johnson,
Humphrey, and Wallace just as I am going to bur this flag."
08 People v. Radich, 53 Misc.2d 717; probable jurisdiction noted by United
States Supreme Court, 400 U.S. 864; aff'd per curiam, 402 U.S. 989 (1970).
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A divided state court upheld conviction, on the ground that
in its police power the state might restrict acts posing "an im-
mediate threat to public safety, peace, or order," and "desecra-
tion" might lead to this. The exhibited constructions constituted
a contemptuous use of the flag. A section of the same statute
excluded ornamental pictures from the prohibition, but the ma-
jority felt that the constructions were not ornamental even by
contemporary community standards; nor could they be considered
"pictures." "[T]he legislative intent was to protect from prosecu-
tion the printed, painted, or affixed use of the American flag
solely for ornamental, as distinguished from advertising purposes."
So the court disposed of the argument that the act was class
legislation, in violation of the equal protection clause. Any con-
temptuous use would fall within the statute, whether two-
dimensional or three-dimensional.
A dissenter chose to treat the exhibit-flags, music, and all-
as a whole, and that as an act of protest. "We may quarrel with
his theme, disagree with his method, condemn his goal. We
cannot dispute his right to express dissent even though the means
be loathsome to us."100
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the New York court per curiam. And divided four to four, Mr.
Justice Douglas not participating. In such situations, the judg-
ment of the lower court stands.' 01
In a similar case involving the same defendant and decided
only three weeks earlier,1' the Supreme Court of New York
County in an action brought by a private party, has upheld
99 For a discussion of the notion that the medium in which the idea is com-
municated carries important social and personal consequences, and is the nexus of
choice of medium and freedom of expression, see M. McLuHm_, UNDERSTANDING
MmanL: THE EXTENSION OF MAN 7-21 (1964). "In a culture like ours, long ac-
customed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes
a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operation and practical fact, the medium
is the message." Id. at 7. See also, Note, 68 COLUm. L. BEv. 1091, supra note
53, and Sutherland v. DeWulf, where the court, in remarking that the flag
burners could have "conveyed any possible idea that they may have intended to
any conceivable audience by means other than burning the flag in a public place.
The guarantee of free speech is more concerned with the substance of the speech
than the form of the communication," dearly showed it had missed the point.
100 People v. Radich, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686 (1967).
101 See Durante v. Essex, 101 U.S. 555 (1879); United Gas Public Service Co.
v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938); and Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263
(1960).
102 United States Flag Foundation v. Radich, 53 Misc.2d 597 (1967).
1972]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
recovery of damages. Without attempting to balance the prin-
ciples of freedom of expression and avoidance of breach of peace,
it declared that "the desecration of our flag cannot be utilized as
a symbolic act to publish or exhibit disagreement with or opposi-
tion to the policies of our Government"10 3 and "to permit such
desecration under the guise of freedom of speech would certainly
weaken, if not destroy, one of our most cherished symbols."'0 4
Another opportunity to decide a profanation case was side-
stepped when the Supreme Court denied certiorari'0 5 for a de-
cision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held
the New York statute unconstitutional. Its decision, Long Island
Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,0° disagreed with
a decision 017 of a three judge court of the Eastern District of New
York that § 136(a) of the General Business Law'08 was merely
inapplicable to an emblem, and it flatly declared that statute in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The emblem was the so-called "peace emblem" appearing on
decals and buttons: a representation of the national flag with
seven white stars in a blue canton, and eleven red and white
stripes, with a symbol resembling a white trident, facing down-
ward, in a white circle, superimposed. The court felt that anyone
seeing the emblem could instantly conclude that it was a repre-
sentation of the flag, so the statute was applicable 0 9 As so
construed, the statute was overbroad, as "traditional First Amend-
ment activity may be swept within its ambit.""O Quoting from
the lower court:
The district attorney's broad reading of the sub-section would
make criminal the possession of all of those reproductions
on the face of President John F. Kennedy superimpoesed
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Calm, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
106 Id.
107 322 F.Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
108 See note 80, supra.
109 At issue in Gwathmey v. Town of East Hampton, 437 F.2d 351 (2d
Cir. 1970), was a flag like the United States flag, except that the peace symbol
formed the canton. The decision in Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm.
decided the same day, was held controlling. See also State v. Liska, 268 N.E.2d 824(Ohio 1970), where prosecution for use of a decal of this nature under the Ohio
statute, Ono REv. CoDE § 2921.05 (Anderson 1967), was successful.
110 Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344, 348
(2d Cir. 1970).
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upon a picture of the American flag which hang on the walls
of shops, homes and offices all over this country. And what
of the millions of celluloid campaign buttons which for genera-
tions, including the time before this statute was enacted, have
carried the photographs of the aspiring Presidential and other
candidates against a background of one or more American
flags in full color?"'
In following the usual practice of refusing to accord the same
degree of state control, or lack of it, to symbolic speech and pure
speech, the court examined the criteria set forth by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Street v. New York, and found no valid state interest
in the statutory prohibitions respecting the flag. The statute had
not been meant to forbid incitement of onlookers, to proscribe
expression tending to provoke violent retaliation, to protect the
sensibilities of passers-by, or to ensure respect for the flag. In the
case at bar, the state had no valid interest in forbidding the
emblem, which was a legitimate means of expressing political
views. The statute was also denounced because it did not provide
enforcement officials adequate guidance concerning what was
proscribed:
Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforce-
ment officers with too much arbitrary discretion in deter-
mining whether or not a certain emblem is grounds for
prosecution. It permits only that expression which local
officials will tolerate; for example, it permits local officials to
prosecute peace demonstrators but to allow "patriotic" orga-
nizations and political candidates to go unprosecuted. This
opportunity for discriminatory selective enforcement . . .
renders the statute unconstitutional. 112
The question which the Street court did not answer-whether
the states might without violating the Fourteenth Amendment
protect the flag from non-verbal acts of "desecration"-has been
affirmatively answered by a California court which aligned itself
with the Warren-Black-Fortas-White grouping, but whose judg-
ment the Supreme Court also declined to review. In People v.
111 Id. The quotation is from 322 F. Supp. 559, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).




Cowgill,"3 a protester had worn on the streets a flag cut up and
sewn into a vest and was prosecuted under a statute making it a
misdemeanor publicly to mutilate, deface, defile, or trample upon
a flag of the United States.
Accepting, as other courts had done, the O'Brien case in-
dicated that "an apparently limitless variety of conduct" could
not "be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct" intended to express an idea. The California court went
on to the next step, that when speech and non-speech elements
are combined in the same conduct, the state could penalize the
non-speech element and engage in justified limitations on free-
doms. The state has an interest in preventing breaches of peace,
and so this conviction was sustained. The fact that no breach
occurred here because of the wearing of the vest was immaterial,
as on another occasion there might have been a breach. It added
that Georgia" and New Jersey" 5 had come up with the same
answer.
Analysis of the Georgia case cited in Cowgill reveals a different
fact situation, reasoning, and philosophy, so that one can question
its pertinence. There, some 250 people gathered at the Crisp
County, Georgia, court house, in a 1966 freedom march. De-
fendants, members of the crowd, proceeded to lower United
States and Georgia flags from their poles. One of the defendants
declared that the black community was then in mourning, and
he intended to lower the flag to half mast to symbolize the mourn-
ing. As the flag was being lowered, others in the group closed
in, removed the flags from the lanyard, tearing the United States
flag and damaging the Georgia flag, and then shook the flags in
the faces of police officers stationed nearby.
Conviction under the Georgia statute" 6 was sustained, the
court expressly denying that the statute was vague or that a
113 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 896 U.S. 371 (1970).
114 Henton v. State, 154 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. 1967), rev'd per curiam sub nom,
390 U.S. No. 206 (1968).
115 State v. Schlueter, 28 A.2d 249 (N.J. 1941).
116 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-7202 (1917). It shall also be unlawful for any per-
sons, firm or corporation to mutilate, deface, deffle or contemptuously abuse the
flag or national emblem of the United States by any act whatever. Georgia Sessions
Law, at 985 (1960), extended this to the state flag. GA. CODE ANN. § 86-1210(1960).
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question of freedom of speech was involved. Halter v. Nebraska"7
was applied; the Georgia statute had been enacted after that
decision and followed the language of the Nebraska statute there
upheld, so it could be assumed that the Georgia legislature was
cognizant of the decision. The conduct sought to be prohibited
was the showing of disrespect for the flag. Nothing was said
about breach of the peace as an element upholding validity,
though in fact the flag had been profaned in a breach of peace.
It is submitted the case would have rested on sounder ground
if it had been related to breach of the peace, rather than treat-
ment of the flag as a sacred object per se.
The flag had been torn from a flagpole in front of a court
house. The point was not mentioned, but it is possible that that
flag belonged to the county, in which case a new factor could
have been introduced: destruction of public property.
The act of protest was against the failure of the county to
observe the same mourning which the black community was
observing. The published report does not describe the nature
of the mourning, a point which, it is submitted, might be of
political or psychological interest, if not legal significance, if the
mourning had been proclaimed by a higher governmental level.
Nor can the New Jersey case be of much help in a freedom
of expression controversy. There, a German girl was prosecuted,
just before the United States entered World War II, under a
New Jersey statute which declared that "any person who publicly
mutilates, tramples upon or otherwise defaces or defiles any
flag, standard, color or ensign of the United States or state flag
of this state, whether the same be public or private property, is
guilty of a misdemeanor."-"8 To show off before some men, she
proclaimed herself a Nazi, and pulled a small American flag
from the front of her motorcycle, broke the staff, crumbled the
flag, and then threw it to the ground. Conviction turned entirely
on her contention that the statute intended to penalize an act
with a willful, malicious, or evil intent. Freedom of expression
was not argued. The court, in approving the charge to the jury
that the defendant must have done the act with an evil intent,
117 See discussion, supra.
118 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 107-2 (1937).
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thought that the words "deface" and "defile" had the meaning
of "dishonor," and "dishonor" was purposeful, implying a lively
sense of shaming or equivalent acquiescent callousness.
Necessity for an intention to profane has been reannounced
recently. This doctrine acquitted Miss Schleuter but it saved a
flag burner charged under a Washington statute." 9 That enact-
ment did not in words require that profanation be done in-
tentionally, and the charge that the jury was required to find only
that the defendant had performed the physical act, was rejected
on appeal. 20
The First Amendment issue was not discussed, for the decision
turned instead upon whether profanation condemned by the
statute was malum in se or malum prohibitum. If the offense
was the former, then intention had to be shown; if it were the
latter, mere performance of the act was sufficient to convict. The
defendant's state of mind thus became an issue of fact, to be
ascertained by the jury. The court decided that flag "desecration"
was malum in se, reasoning that the interdicted conduct was
done with an evil design or purpose. 2
Application of the rule that a penal statute must be strictly
construed has taken place in flag cases. It led, in Hoffman v.
United States,22 to the declaration that Congress had intended
to condemn only "physical mutilation, defacement, or defilement
of the flag, its 'physical dishonor or destruction';" therefore
wearing of a flag shirt was not sufficient. The Court of Appeals
of Lucas County, Ohio, did likewise with a defendant who had
worn a sarape made of a flag, with a hole cut in the flag for his
head; there had been no active mutilation, though someone must
have cut the flag to make the hole. 23
13 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.86.010-.070 (1919).
120 State v. Turner, 478 P.2d 747 (Wash. 1970). A recent Iowa case has
disagreed as to the requirement of intent under a profanation statute. State v.
Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971). Since the profanation there was of a
non-protest type it is discussed in the next section.
121 A subsequent amendment (Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 110, at 823)
of the statute requiring that the act be done knowingly andpublicly was said
by the court to supply in words what had earlier been implie in law. State v.
Turner, 478 P.2d 747 (Wash. 1970).
122 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'g 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. 1970).
123 State v. Saionz, 261 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio 1969), interpreting the Ohio
statute. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.05 (Anderson 1967). Flag sarapes are
becoming popular. See State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971), where
one was worn in a nonprotest situation, and Duncomb v. New York, 67 Civ. 1035(Continued on next page)
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The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality
of the federal statute, though validity has been upheld by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reversed on other grounds
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' 24 Abbie
Hoffman, anti-establishment activist, having been subpoenaed to
testify before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-
American Activities (now the Internal Security Committee) was
arrested in 1968 before entering a House Office Building in
Washington for wearing a shirt that resembled an American flag.
Charged with violating the above quoted 18 U.S.C. § 700 (a), in
that he did "knowingly cast contempt upon the flag of the United
States by publicly mutilating, defacing and defiling" the flag, he
referred to himself at the trial as "what people might call a
Hippie" and a "revolutionary artist," though in his brief he used
the expression, "civil rights advocate.' 1 25
The Circuit Court did not reach the constitutional objections
but in three separate opinions declined to apply the statute to
the particular action. By a strict construction the court arrived
at the conclusion that merely wearing a flag-like shirt was not
sufficient evidence of contemptuous defiling; Judge MacKinnon
thought that the two lower courts had concluded the wearing had
actually been contemptuous because Hoffman had been a con-
troversial figure associated with unpopular causes. Judge Robb
confined the offense to "a physical mutilation, defacement, or
defilement," which Hoffman was not shown to have done.
A district court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
have upheld the statute. In Joyce v. United States, 2 the de-
fendant was standing at the rear of the crowd along the parade
route on Inauguration Day 1969, holding a small flag four by six
inches. He removed it from its stick, tore it, folded it lengthwise,
and with the assistance of a companion, tied it to his right index
(Footnote continued tfrom preceding page)
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (unpublished), both cases discussed infra. The fact that a
protester had draped a clean flag about his shoulders while appearing for his
draft physical attired only in a pair of shorts, led a Pennsylvania court to conclude
that the flag had not been defiled. Commonwealth v. Sgorbati, 49 D. & C.2d 173
(Pa. 1970). The court also ruled that the gesture was allowed under a statutory
exemption when flags were used in political demonstrations. See note 38, supra.
124 Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'g 256 A.2d
567 (D.C. 1970).
1 5 Hoffman v. U.S., 256 A.2d 567, 568 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
126 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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finger; then he raised his right hand in a V sign and waved it
back and forth above his head. The District Court, decided
there was sufficient evidence from which could be found beyond
a reasonable doubt that he had knowingly cast contempt upon
the flag by publicly mutilating it, under the 1968 statute. Though
the reversed decision in Hoffman v. United States was referred to
in the Joyce case as decisive of the issue, the Joyce and Hoffman
cases are not analogous. Joyce had used a genuine flag; Hoffman
had not.
Another incident in the 1969 rash of flag misuse brought into
play the analogy of draft card burning-as well as the novel use
of the doctrine of national sovereignty to uphold constitutionality
and conviction. 27 A protester burned a flag in a demonstration
on the steps of a United States District Court House and was
charged with violating the year old federal act. He argued that
his act was one of political protest and the statute was therefore
unconstitutional.
The United States District Court12 applied the standards in
United States v. O'Brien. Legally, then, the draft card and the
flag were equated as the court gave its interpretation of that
decision: when speech and non-speech elements are combined
in the same course of conduct, incidental limitations of first
amendment rights can be tolerated only if the four criteria of the
O'Brien case are satisfied. Notably absent was any discussion of
the likelihood that flag destruction would lead to a breach of the
peace. The court found that all four of the criteria were satisfied.
The authority of Halter v. Nebraska in protest cases is begin-
ning to be questioned. One Duncombe was charged before a
New York police justice with having committed malicious mis-
chief under § 1425 (16) (d), the flag profanation statute quoted
above; he had worn a flag as a sarape. The United States District
Court12 denied that the substantive constitutional issues were
insubstantial, despite Halter v. Nebraska. That case "was decided
127 The court referred to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,
299 U.S. 304 (1936), a case concerned chiefly with the power of the executive in
foreign relations. The selection of a flag was one of the "concomitants of na-
tionality," and the power to select a flag embraced the power to protect it from
contemptuous destruction.
128 United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Cal. 1969).
12 9 Duncomb v. New York, 67 Civ. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (unpublished).
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several years before the protections of the First Amendment
were held to be firmly applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment," mentioning, in a footnote, that the issue of
relationship between the two amendments was unsettled as late
as Gitlow v. United States,130 the case generally regarded as the
first in which the free speech provisions of the First Amendment
were engrafted upon the Fourteenth.
IV. NON-PROTEST PROFANATION
Flag designs have been used in manners that have nothing to
do with protest. Prohibition of employment of flag designs in
commercial advertising has been declared constitutional, but
ornamentation, advocacy of political candidacies, and numerous
other motivations have induced display of flag designs, and, as
pointed out above, it has been in connection with such uses as
well as advertising, rather than destruction or mutilation as acts
of protest, that flag profanation statutes were first passed. Some-
times it is difficult to determine the significance of the use of a
flag design in specific circumstances.' One cannot be sure that
the intention was to protest.
Use of a flag design in non-protest situations has become so
prevalent -32 that application of statutes prohibiting "defiling"
or "defying" assumes a highly subjective character and raises
constitutional points in fact situations that would never have
occurred to framers of the statutes. Where flag designs are worn
for non-protest purposes, the question of symbolic speech does
not arise. The wearer may not be intending to express any
opinion but may be attracted to the design for the same reason
that any other mode of dress might appeal to him. He may even
be impelled by patriotic motives; a 100% American may wear
a red-white-blue tie adorned with stars and stripes for the same
reason that an Irishman might wear green on St. Patrick's Day.
Prosecution of such a person for flag profanation is incongruous.
Though newspaper stories recount numerous arrests for odd uses
130 Id.
131 See e.g., use of a flag designed in a costume worn by Raquel Welch in the
film, Myra Breckenridge.
332 For illustrations of numerous ways in which flag designs have been used,
see LIFE, March 31, 1967, at 18.
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of the national emblem, few non-protest, unconventional uses of
the flag have reached the appellate courts for adjudication.
Illinois133 and New York 34 courts have disagreed over prosecu-
tion for publishing within magazines, pictures of girls wearing
little more than flags. Recently an Iowa court. 5 upheld a statute
similar to the New York statute, under which was convicted a
young man in a flag sarape who walked into and out of a hotel
where he was employed. One desk clerk testified that upon seeing
him "I was more or less crushed," and another, "It just made me
sick." The defendant denied any intention of protesting: "I really
had no intentions whatsoever of anything by wearing this flag."
Employing the four O'Brien criteria in this non-protest situ-
ation, the court felt that the "government clearly has a substantial,
genuine and important interest in protecting the flag from public
desecration. That the state has a legitimate interest in preventing
breaches of the peace which can result from reactions to any
attempted defilement of the flag has long been recognized." The
dubious precedent of Halter v. Nebraska was quoted.
The court also thought it immaterial that no breach of the
peace actually resulted, though it referred to the revulsion felt
by the desk clerks, adding it was only a short step from such
feeling to an act of retribution.13 6 The state was also said to have
an interest in assuring that the defendant should show proper
respect "to our national emblem." A minority of four justices
entertained doubts over constitutionality.
Application of the criteria in the O'Brien case actually is of
little assistance in a discussion of constitutional aspects of pro-
hibitions of this type of profanation. It is difficult to tell just what
interest the state is attempting to protect, for the liberty involved
is not necessarily one of free expression, but one of a more
mundane nature. One can question the constitutional power of
the government to dictate what a citizen shall wear, for ex-
133 People v. Von Rosen, 147 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. 1958).
'34 People v. Keogh, 305 N.Y.S.2d 961, 61 Misc.2d 762 (1969).
335 State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971).
136 The late Mr. Justice Harlan would hardly agree; see his comments in
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The Iowa court called United States v.
Hoffman, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971) authority, but with respect one must
point out that the element of protest was clearly present in that case, and that
Hoffman almost as an incitement had deliberately donned his flag shirt prior to
appearing before a congressional committee. The situations are not analogous.
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ample. 37 But apart from the constitutional and legal aspects
of this type of profanation, one can observe the tremendous dif-
ficulties of enforcement. Use of the national colors and design
is so varied and widespread that almost a special police force
would be needed to extirpate the practice.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Nature of Symbolism
Much of the confusion attendant upon a discussion of flag
profanation stems from the fact that there has never been a
consensus on what the flag symbolizes. Leaving aside sentimental
utterances of patriotic citizens, one meets a startling diversity of
opinion among responsible authorities. Does the flag symbolize
the country, the United States as a nation, the United States as a
state, the government of the United States, the constitution, the
sum total of all the policies initiated and implemented by the
government, just some of the policies, all the ideals possessed by
the founders of the nation, some of them (depending upon the
predilections of the speaker) or the whole American cosmos-
state, government, people, politics, geography, ideals?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to it as "the symbol of our
national life." 3 ' Federal courts have also called it "the symbol
of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, how-
ever large, within the framework of the Constitution."1 39 Other
courts have diverged widely. The New York Court of Appeals
said it was "the symbol of our country, of the ideals embodied in
our Constitution, and.., of the spirit which should animate our
institutions." 4 ° In the opinion of the Illinois courts, it is "an
emblem of national sovereignty"; and in Hawaii an extremely
broad answer has been given:
141
137 ". . . it seems to us that red, white and blue trousers with or without stars
are trousers and not a flag and that it is beyond the state's competence to dictate
color and design of clothing, even bad taste clothing." Parker v. Morgan, 822
F. Supp. 585, 588 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
138 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 819 U.S. 624, 661 (1943).
'39 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) and Minerville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
140 People ex rel Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523, 18 N.E.2d 840 (1939).
141 Ruhstrat v. People, supra.
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The flag is an emblem which, if it can be said to represent
anything, is a symbolic representation of the United States
as a nation, a unified body politic embracing the bad as well
as the good and welded into one by common bond of territory
and history. It is not symbolic of segmented fragments of the
American nation, whether they be American military might
or race riots, Rocky mountain majesty or night life in Las
Vegas, Vietnam involvement or peace marches against it. 4'
An examination of debate in the House of Representatives
on the adoption of the flag profanation statute likewise reveals
lack of agreement. 43 The flag was said to be symbolic of
America:
[O]ur great Nation; our national purpose; our unique way of
life; our freedom, of our country, and of our greatness as a
nation; all we love and value in our great Nation; the Nation-
the Government of the United States-and all that it stands
for; the American Nation, its people, and its free government;
American dreams and aspirations, of American stubborness
and courage, and of American purpose, sacrifice, and achieve-
ment; the greatness and pride of this land; the idea of
federation, and the unity of 50 sovereign states; the dignity
of the flag is indeed consistent with the idea of our States'
rights and responsibilities; and our Nation's independence.
• . .our freedom, and . . .the precious heritage won for us
by brave men and women over the generations.
One Congressman saw a property right in the flag, belonging to
all Americans, so that burning a flag was likened to the burning
of another's house. Another compared it to the Queen of England.
The analyst can count in these few congressional utterances at
least eight different and not all consistent elements which the
flag is thought to symbolize.
One is impressed by the variety the further one proceeds into
the writings of others. Woodrow Wilson described the flag as
"the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose
142 Hon. Masato Doi, in orally delivered decision of Circuit Court of First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, State v. Kent, No. 36, 423, December 9, 1966. The text
is reprinted in Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 4, supra note 6, at 175.
143 113 CONG. Ric. part 8 (daily ed. April 30, 1967).
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as a nation. It has no other character than that which we give
it from generation to generation." 44
Robert G. Ingersoll had a less conservative interpretation:
The flag for which our heroes fought for which they died,
is the symbol of all we are, of all we hope to be.
It is the emblem of equal rights.
It means free hands, free lips, self-government, and the sov-
ereignty of the individual ....
It means the perpetual right of peaceful revolution....
It means that all distinctions based on birth or blood have
perished from our laws; that our Government shall stand
between labor and capital, between the weak and the strong,
between the individual and the corporation, between want
and wealth, and give and guarantee simple justice to each and
all.14
5
The plethora of answers to the question-what does the flag
symbolize?-evoked this answer from Mr. Justice Jackson, in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:
Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious
symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated with
many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of acceptance
or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee.
A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and
what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest
and scorn.
14 6
A flag, therefore, often contains the meaning which the user
or misuser wishes to put into it. The Confederate battle flag to
many is a symbol of the Confederacy but since the outlawry of
school segregation it is to others a symbol of resistance to inte-
gration, and even a mark of white racism in general. 47 Con-
'44 Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917, in W. WILsON, IN Otl FrST YEARl OF
WAR 64 (1918).
145 PoLrrIcAL SPEEcHEs OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL 431-32 (Dresden ed. 1914).
1463 19 U.S. 624, 632-633 (1942).
347 See Smith v. St. Tanmmany Parish School Board, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (D. La.
1970), where a federal district court judge in an integration case ordered all
indicia of segregation, even Confederate nags, removed from the schools, and
Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970), where black
students had objected to a school flag resembling a Confederate flag.
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versely, testimony was presented to a House Subcommittee in
1967 that the national flag had been burned in some southern
states as a protest against the national policy of racial integra-
tion.148 To some, the flag has represented the capitalist class. 49
The symbolism of a flag is thus subjective and even transitory,
varying with the individuals involved, the circumstances, and
the historical period. Almost as varied are the objects of protest
when flags, foreign and American, are profaned. Recent public
destructions of flags in anti-war demonstrations are protests
against a policy of the United States government, and probably
not, in most cases, against the United States as a nation, state,
or country. Destruction of the swastika flag on the German vessel
Bremen in New York harbor in 1935 was likewise a protest against
a government policy, probably not against the German nation
or state (though also against the German government of the
day).'5 When Secretary of War John A. Dix gave orders in 1861
to shoot anyone who attempted to haul down the national flag in
New Orleans he had in mind persons who might challenge the
sovereignty of the American state and government, though pos-
sibly not the American nation.' Demonstrators profaned the
flag of the U.S.S.R. in protest at the forcible removal of a
Lithuanian defector from an American ship, but, curiously enough,
the flag profaned was not of the country, nation, state, or gov-
ernment that was ultimately responsible, at least morally; it was
of the government whose agents were allowed to seize the
defector.'
Unless, then, one is prepared to protect the flag as an object,
and thereby embrace the cult of vexillatry, one must follow the
statement of Mr. Justice Jackson above, and accord to protest
flag profanation the constitutional protection given to all symbolic
acts, regardless of the meaning placed in the symbol, and regard-
less of the object of the protest, except for the one set of cir-
cumstances discussed below.
The flag is a tangible symbol-secular, temporal, limited to a
historical era, functional, and created by law, yet deeply rooted in
148 Hearings before Subcomm. No. 4, supra note 6, at 174.
149 People v. Chambers, 22 Cal. App. 687, 72 P.2d 746 (1937).
150 New York Times, July 27, 1935.
151 HAIInISON, supra note 72, at 183.
152 The Sunday Star, December 6, 1970.
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tradition and capable of evoking emotion and sincere devotion. 53
But because of the disparity of opinion as to just what it sym-
bolizes, one cannot prohibit any and all profanation, lest freedom
of expression be endangered.
If the flag be held to symbolize the state, as that term is
generally defined in constitutional and international law, one
could logically protest the existence of that institution by destroy-
ing or mutilating its symbol. An anti-state protester, say an
anarchist, could express himself against the state symbolically as
well as by words.
If one considers it the symbol of the nation, it could be argued
that one opposed to the concept of the nation (and there have
been many in the world's history) or the American nation could
write against it as well as symbolically attack it by deed.
If the flag is thought to symbolize a federal republican
union, an opponent of that system might not only speak against
it, but physically attack its symbol, or even destroy the symbol
if he thinks the principle of federalism has been compromised.
Thus in view of Thomas Jefferson's admonition in his First
Inaugural Address-"If there be any among us who would wish
to dissolve this union or to change its republican form, let them
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat
153 There is some question about the propriety, or even the possibility of
pledging allegiance to a flag. If one discards the feudal meaning of the term,
allegiance connotes, according to WEBSTERas NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (2d. ed.):
.... the tie or obligation of a subject to his sovereign or government;
the duty of fidelity to one's king, government, or sovereign state.
Originally allegiance was a feudal, and therefore personal relation or
obligation; this conception has given place in civilized nations to the
political concept of it as a relation or obligation of a citizen to his
sovereign or government, or of an alien to the government under which
he resides.... Devotion or loyalty to that which is entitled to obedience
or service and respect; as, allegiance to science.
Strictly speaking since the flag is a symbol one does not serve or obey it, though
he may respect it. One owes allegiance to a country, a nation, a government, a
ruler, a set of principles, or an ideology he does not owe allegiance to the symbol
of those concepts. If, on the other hand, one is said to owe allegiance to the flag
as an object, vexillatry becomes a species of idolatry, and the objection of
Jehovah's Witnesses to saluting the flag acquires a logical as well as scriptural
basis. Communists, incidentally, have been known to pledge allegiance to a red
flag. People v. Mintz, 106 Cal. App. 725, 290 P.2d 93 (1930). The American's
Creed, written by William Tyler Page, did not fall into this error. In part it reads,
"I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it; to support its con-
stitution; to obey its laws; to respect its flag; and to defend it against all enemies."
56 CONG. REC. 4745 (1918).
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it"'154-one can hardly argue against symbolic opposition in the
form of destruction of the symbol.
When one looks upon the flag as a means to express his
opposition to government policies, then the problem of restricting
expression becomes acute. If the state, nation, and government
are not sacrosanct-and Mr. Justice Jackson went far in the
direction of saying just that-certainly the government's policies
are not, and a fortiori, its symbols. The practice is widespread
of destroying or mutilating an object not out of disrespect for the
physical form of the object, but to protest departure from that
which the object is supposed to represent. Such behavior goes
far back into ancient history155 and seems to have escaped the
devotees of the cult. This being the case, it is difficult to con-
demn, on the theory of freedom of expression, abuse of a flag.
The flag, by virtue of its singular character and the esteem in
which it is held by the American people, must be placed in a
class by itself, in any discussion of its abuse as a means of non-
symbolic speech, or protest. It therefore rates more selective
treatment than a utilitarian object like a draft card or a test of
printed words. If it is destroyed or mutilated in public, it is not
at all impossible that the reaction from on-lookers would be
different from what it might be if something else were subjected
to like treatment.
But the flag is not an idol, fetish, charm, or the repository of
the soul of the nation, as was the Golden Stool of the Asbnti in
the Old Gold Coast. 56 Nor can it become the country, by a process
of transubstantiation, despite a remark on the floor of the House
of Representatives: "He who publicly and intentionally desecrates
154 BASIC WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333 (P. Foner ed. 1944).
155 The biblical Moses broke the stone tablets upon which the law had been
inscribed not to protest that law or its source but because of the waywardness of
his followers in department from divine teaching. Exodus 32:19.
356 A Washington statute requiring applicants for teachers' licenses to swear
or affirm, inter alia:
by precept and example [to] promote respect for the flag and the in-
stitutions of the United States of America and the State of Washington
was held to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because of vagueness; the range of activities that might be deemed incon-
sistent with premises of the act was too broad. Even criticism of the
design or color scheme of the state flag or unfavorable comparison of it
with that of a sister State or foreign country could be deemed disre-
spectful and therefore violative of the oath.
Bagett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 377 (1964).
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the precious symbol of our country is committing an actual assault
upon the country. Regardless of the accident of his birth, he is an
enemy and should be treated like an enemy, whether he be a
foreign enemy or domestic enemy."'" 7
Laws against flag profanation appear to be peculiarly suscepti-
ble to use against persons who endorse unpopular causes. One
who protests, in this manner, a government policy may easily be
accused of attacking the whole social order. An objective of the
profanation statutes may be to stimulate patriotism, but there
have been instances in which virtually identical acts of misuse
brought official displeasure in some instances but not in others.15
This danger was pointed out in Long Island Vietnam Moratorium
Committee v. Cahn.
The statement in Street v. New York, that promotion of
patriotism is not a legitimate interest of the government, may be
startling but can hardly be open to argument, if one assumes that
the expression of all shades of political opinion is entitled to
constitutional protection. "Patriotism" is capable of a variety of
meanings, as is flag symbolism; it is often applied to the support of
various aspects of the existing order, so the government should
have no interest in restricting peaceful expressions of opinions
which some people might not like. This is not to say, of course,
that government officials should not employ national symbols, like
flying the flag over post offices or displaying the flag in a court-
room.
Flag profanation laws, most of which are at least a half
century old, may thus be classed as ritual of the cult of vexillatry,
a tenet of which is veneration of the flag as an end in itself: the
confusion of symbol and object, content and form, spirit and
matter, animus and res. That tenet distinguishes in an extreme
manner between a rightfully unique and justifiably respected
object, on the one hand, and ordinary objects, on the other, in
157 113 CONG. REC. 16446 (1967) (remarks of Congressman Maston O'Neal
of Georgia).15s In Delaware one was prosecuted for flying the flag at half mast, on the
wrong side of the United Nations flag, as a protest against the Vietnam war.
Hodson v. Buckson, supra. Yet in April 1971, the Governor of Indiana ordered
flags to be flown at half mast to protest the conviction of Lt. William R. Calley
for the willful killing of South Vietnamese civilians. NEwsw April 12, 1971,
at 27. In both cases someone wanted to protest a government policy or action.
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such a way as to endanger the constitutional protection given
symbolic speech.
This writer would not, however, accept the views of some
that nonsymbolic and symbolic speech should be accorded the
same status, especially in respect to flags. Flags are clearly sui
generis. If violence results from their misuse, such misuse should
be recognized as an aggravating factor in any prosecution for
breach of peace, malicious mischief, or similar offense. There
seems to be little reason why the aggravating factor should not
be recognized by statute, rather than by judicial pronouncement,
and such an enactment would make unnecessary the numerous
acts which now make flag "desecration" a separate crime. By
making flag "desecration" simply one degree, or variety, of
breach of peace, the problem of flag profanation as symbolic
speech can be eliminated, the perils of overbreadth removed,
and the interest of the state in preserving order retained. The
flag can then occupy its rightful place in American life. Similarly,
those who use the flag in peaceful protest should be protected
from the aggression of troublemakers.159
B. Symbolic Speech and the Courts
Courts have not accorded parity to pure speech and non-
symbolic speech, though both types of expression are employed
to disseminate an idea or voice a protest. The exact point at
which treatment of the two types of "speech" begins to diverge
has not yet been fixed with finality, although the Supreme Court
has begun, in O'Brien v. United States, to chart out this ter-
ritory. The criteria laid down in that case, especially that which
recognizes an interest of the state superior to that of allowing
untrammeled expression, appear to this writer to be sound, as
does their application to flag cases.
159 Courts might not always agree with this. In Lapolla v. Dullaghan, 311
N.Y.S.2d 485 (1970), the Supreme Court of Westchester County, New York, en-joined school officials from lowering the flag at a high school, in response to a
petition from students and faculty, as an expression for the four dead Kent State
students and the Vietnam war casualties. A Veteran's group had indicated "they
would take all necessary steps to prevent the lowering of the flag." The court
feared imminence of a confrontation that would have a "negative effect on the
community," and added, "The flag should not be a vehicle for the expression of
political, social or economic philosophy, a rather broad statement which this
writer feels the judge writing the opinion would, on more mature reflection, modify.
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Differences in opinions of lower courts, as well as the multipli-
cation of flag profanation cases, make it virtually inevitable that
the Supreme Court will settle the basic issue: May physical pro-
fanation of the flag as a means of symbolic expression be pro-
hibited? No opinion is here ventured as to what the decision will
be, but caution is expressed against placing reliance on the
broad dicta in the bellwether case of Halter v. Nebraska, a case
related to advertising, not political expression, and decided long
before First Amendment freedoms were engrafted upon the
Fourteenth. Nor can much significance be attached to the fact
that four justices in the Street case court have left the bench.
There remains the question of non-protest use of the flag.
Halter v. Nebraska allows states to restrict the use of the flag in
advertising, and is in line with the practice of distinguishing
between the protection of commercial advertising and that of
political protests. There is some difference of opinion as to
which type of freedom enjoys a superior position; 6' in Radich
v. New York, the New York City Criminal Court thought that
prohibiting the use of the flag in advertising was less a "desecra-
tion", and therefore less a threat to the public order, than the
particular type of profanation with which it was dealing, the
modeling of flags into constructions. The present writer would
reverse the priorities, and find greater profanation in commercial
exploitation than there is in political protest, but regardless of
one's philosophical leanings adequate constitutional grounds exist
for the restraint of commercial use.
For prohibition of noncommercial, nonprotest uses little justi-
fication can be found on constitutional grounds. Absent threats
to the peace, which would be extremely rare (for who would
start a riot upon seeing a girl wearing a red, white and blue skirt
adorned with stars and stripes?) a governmental interest in such
restrictions on personal conduct is indeed hard to locate. Dicta in
Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn respecting
use of the design might also be applicable here. The court in
the passage quoted above condemned prohibition of numerous
160 For differences in treatment of commercial and noncommercial com-
munications see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); New York Times v. Sullivan, 375 U.S. 254 (1964);
and Note, 66 MCII. L. liv. 1040, supra note 53.
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uses, mostly of a politically communicative nature, and it is
probably not presumptuous to suppose that prohibition of non-
protest uses would also be condemned. Why, for example, should
not a presidential photograph not be embellished with the like-
nesses of flags?
Whether the actual enforcement of flag profanation laws is
feasible or even possible is, of course, another question. Use of a
flag design is so widespread that if steps were taken to curb all
unconventional uses the patriots might be the first to protest.
On the other hand, one need not be an adherent of the cult of
vexillatry to urge that within the limits set by common sense, the
public peace, and the right of expression, the national emblem
should be accorded every respect.
